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Abstract
The complexity of today’s supply chain, organised in several tiers and in-
cluding many companies located in different countries, makes it challenging
to assess the history and integrity of procured physical parts, and to make
organisations really accountable for their conduct. This enables malicious
practices like counterfeiting and insertion of back doors, which are extremely
dangerous, especially in supply chains of physical parts for industrial control
systems used in critical infrastructures, where a country and human lives can
be put at risk.
This paper aims at mitigating these issues by proposing an approach
where procured parts are uniquely identified and tracked along the chain,
across multiple sites, to detect tampering. Our solution is based on consor-
tium blockchain and smart contract technologies, hence it is decentralised,
highly available and provides strong guarantees on the integrity of stored
data and executed business logic. The unique identification of parts along
the chain is implemented by using physically unclonable functions (PUFs)
as tamper-resistant IDs.
We first define the threat model of an adversary interested in tampering
with physical products along the supply chain, then provide the design of the
tracking system that implements the proposed anti-counterfeiting approach.
We present a security analysis of the tracking system against the designated
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threat model and a prototype evaluation to show its technical feasibility and
assess its effectiveness in counterfeit mitigation. Finally, we discuss several
key practical aspects concerning our solution ad its integration with real
supply chains.
Keywords: supply chain, physically unclonable function, blockchain, smart
contract, counterfeit detection, tracking
1. Introduction
Counterfeited products can lead to catastrophic consequences, in partic-
ular when such products are used in critical infrastructure, military applica-
tions or in food and medicine industries. These include significant economic
losses (e.g. in the order of billion USD per year in the UK [1]), serious security
risks from malfunctioning military weapons and vehicles due to counterfeited
parts [2], and potentially loss for human lives (e.g. deaths due to contam-
inated food, such as 2018 E. coli infection 1). It is therefore of paramount
importance to develop and deploy effective strategies for counterfeit mitiga-
tion to ensure a trustworthy and secure supply chain. One of main factors
magnifying the scale of the counterfeit problem is the trend towards global-
isation. The latter is driven by the need to cut costs to gain a competitive
advantage and resulted in a remarkable growth of outsourcing levels, which
in turn led to a significant increase of supply chains complexity because more
firms are involved and the chain must be spread over further tiers [3]. Such
an evolution of the supply chain structure has brought about a number of
serious challenges linked to the problem of counterfeiting:
• Visibility [4]. The network of buyer-supplier relationships has become
more intricate and participants have little to no visibility and control
on upstream stages, which makes it harder to assess the integrity of
procured parts.
• Traceability [5]. Tracking data is fragmented and spread among in-
volved companies, which makes it very challenging to uniquely identify
1Multistate Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections Linked to Romaine Lettuce (Fi-
nal Update), available online https://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2018/o157h7-04-18/index.
html
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each procured item and trace its history back to its origin and, in case
of incidents, there is a shortage of data that can be used for forensics
investigations.
• Accountability [6]. In such a scenario afflicted by obscurity and lack
of information, fraudulent conduct of companies is noticeably facili-
tated. There is a lack of means to keep organisations accountable for
the portion of processing they handle within the supply chain.
Coping with counterfeiting in these supply chains calls for a platform
integrated throughout the whole chain to reliably record every transition of
products between involved companies. The availability of such a ledger would
be an effective means to provide any legitimate actor with precise information
on what organisations are operating at upstream stages of the chain (visi-
bility) and on the history of each procured item (traceability). Moreover,
ensuring recorded transactions are truthful and not tampered with is crucial
to enable legally binding liability policies (accountability). The implementa-
tion of such a platform for counterfeit mitigation requires an infrastructure
deployed over the considered supply chain, to enable fine-grained monitor-
ing of physical parts sold and bought by involved companies. It would be
infeasible to identify a single specific authority or enterprise eligible for con-
trolling and operating an infrastructure like this, possibly spanning different
countries and diverse regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, such an author-
ity should be trusted globally and have the resources to effectively setup and
maintain such a world-wide, complex interconnected network, ensuring at
the same time top levels of security, availability and performance.
A decentralised approach is more suitable, where the infrastructure itself
is a peer-to-peer network distributed across all the supply chain partners,
devoid of any centralised control that may become a single point of failure
or a performance bottleneck. An emerging technology that lends itself well
to implement a platform like that is the blockchain, because of its full de-
centralisation, high availability and strong guarantees on the immutability
of stored data. In brief, a blockchain is a distributed system consisting of
a network of peer nodes sharing a ledger of transactions, where each peer
keeps a replica of that ledger. The consistency among replicas is ensured
by a distributed consensus algorithm run by all the nodes, which also guar-
antees that transactions cannot be censored or redacted unless an attacker
succeeded in controlling a certain percentage of nodes or of computational
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power. In addition to storing data, blockchain can be used to execute ap-
plication logic through the smart contract technology. A smart contract is
an application whose code and execution traces are stored immutably in the
blockchain, which provides strong guarantees on execution integrity.
Since such infrastructure has to be run across a predefined set of par-
ties, and considering that part of managed data is not meant to be dis-
closed publicly, it is reasonable to not rely on existing public permissionless
blockchains like Ethereum’s. Rather, it is more sensible to build on a con-
sortium blockchain where nodes are authenticated, membership is predeter-
mined and data cannot be accessed from the outside.
In this paper, we propose an approach for item tracking in supply chains
based on consortium blockchain and smart contract technologies. Items are
uniquely identified to enable tracking by using tamper-proof tags. We choose
to use physically unclonable functions (PUF) to implement those tags. PUFs
are circuits that provide unique signatures deriving from manufacturing pro-
cess variations of the circuits themselves. Each alteration of those tags leads
to changes of the function computed by the PUF, hence this technology is
well suited to enable counterfeit detection. We provide the design of a supply
chain management system based on the proposed approach and carry out a
preliminary analysis on its effectiveness and feasibility. We define the ad-
versary model to characterise what types of threats can arise in the context
of supply chain counterfeit. We then analyse how the proposed design can
address those threats to deliver improved counterfeit detection. Finally, to
show the technical feasibility of this solution, we describe its prototype imple-
mentation and preliminary experimental evaluation, where we measure the
effectiveness of using PUFs for counterfeit detection. Finally, we provide an
ample discussion on some key pragmatic aspects of integrating the proposed
platform with real supply chains.
Although some other blockchain-based supply chain management systems
have been proposed in literature and industry, a few of them rely on PUFs
for item tracking. The main novelty of this work lies in the level of detail
of the proposed design, the corresponding security analysis and prototype
implementation and evaluation.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we rely on blockchain, smart contract
and PUF technologies to design a tracking system of physical parts for supply
chain management, aimed at mitigating the problem of counterfeiting. With
respect to the state of the art on this topic, our main research contributions
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are
• the explicit modelling of the overall system, including supply chain,
blockchain, smart contracts, PUFs and adversary behaviour, i.e. the
threat model ;
• the detailed design of the proposed tracking system for detecting coun-
terfeits in supply chains;
• based on the designated threat model, the identification of the possible
attacks to the tracking system aimed to bypass counterfeit detection;
• the analysis of how the proposed tracking system reacts against each
of the identified attacks;
• a prototype implementation and preliminary experimental evaluation of
the proposed tracking system, where PUF-based counterfeit detection
accuracy is assessed;
• a discussion on most relevant points concerning the integration of our
solution in real scenarios.
Paper Organisation. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 describes related work. Section 3 introduce background information
on PUF, blockchain and smart contract technologies. The system model is
presented in section 4, as well as the threat model. Our tracking system is
detailed in section 5 and its security properties are analysed in section 6.
Section 7 describes the prototype implementation and evaluation. Section 8
discusses security analysis results and the limitations of our solution. Finally,
section 9 outlines conclusion and future work.
2. Related Work
The use of blockchain and smart contracts for supply chain management
is currently being investigated in some recent industrial projects 2 3, and led
2How Blockchain Will Transform The Supply Chain And Logis-
tics Industry (https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/03/23/
how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry)
3Using blockchain to drive supply chain transparency (https://www2.deloitte.com/
us/en/pages/operations/articles/blockchain-supply-chain-innovation.html)
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to the launch of a number of new businesses and companies, which supports
the perceived potentialities of this application. Some of these projects use
a blockchain-as-a-service solution provided by a third party, such as Trade-
Lends 4, which employs the platform delivered by IBM Cloud. The limita-
tion of such an approach is the need to totally trust an external organisation,
which brings about the same issues mentioned before regarding centralisa-
tion.
Different companies use diverse technologies to tag products and reliably
link physical assets to the blockchain. WaBi [7] and Waltonchain [8] use
RFID (Radio-frequency identification) as tags to identify and track items
along the chain. Others make use of proprietary solutions. For example,
BlockVerify [9] uses their own Block Verify tags, Chronicled [10] employs
trusted IoT chips, Skuchain [11] applies Proof of Provenance codes called
Popcodes. The problem of existing approaches that rely on the use of RFID-
based tags is that these tags are vulnerable to cloning attacks [12, 13], this
makes it less effective in protecting against counterfeit attempts.
We propose to produce tamper-proof tags by using physically unclonable
functions (PUF), i.e. circuits that can generate a unique identifier for each
chip due to the intrinsic variability of the IC fabrication process. Previously
reported works on using PUF technology in the context of supply chain man-
agement are limited in both scope and depth. Guardtime [14] proposes the
use of PUF for IoT device authentication, but provides no clear informa-
tion on the integration with supply chain. Islam et al. [15] propose the use of
PUF for tracing integrated circuits (IC). Their work is focussed on hardware-
supply chain and does not investigate in depth what security guarantees are
provided. To the best of our knowledge, the latter aspect, i.e. the lack
of appropriate security analysis of the proposed solution, is currently a gap
in the state of the art on the application of blockchain and smart contract
technologies for counterfeiting mitigation in supply chains.
Alzahrani and Bulusu [16] present Block-Supply Chain, a design for a
blockchain-based supply chain where products are tracked using Near Field
Communication (NFC) technology to detect counterfeits. Their security
analysis is limited to the novel consensus protocol they propose and does
not take into account any other aspect of the overall supply chain ecosystem,
which includes, but is not restricted to, the blockchain. Furthermore, they
4TradeLends, available online https://www.tradelens.com/
6
do not define a threat model to specify what attacks they want to defend
from.
Toyoda et al. [17] introduce a blockchain-based solution for product own-
ership management system, to be used to prevent counterfeits in the post
supply chain. They explain how their system allows to detect counterfeits,
and discuss the provided security guarantees only in terms of the possible
vulnerabilities of the underlying technology they use, i.e. Ethereum 5. Also
in this case, there is no explicit modelling of the adversary to identify possible
attacks and analyse how the proposed solution copes with them.
Similarly, Negka et al. [18] describes a method to detect counterfeit IoT
devices by tracking each single device component along the supply chain.
They rely on PUFs to authenticate components and implement their detec-
tion logic in Ethereum. Although they provide some figures on the fees to pay
to use Ethereum smart contracts, they do not detail how PUFs and smart
contracts are integrated, nor what specific mechanism is actually employed to
implement the detection. Obtained detection accuracy and provided security
guarantees are not discussed.
3. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some preliminary background on physically
unclonable functions (section 3.1) and blockchain and smart contract tech-
nology (section 3.2).
3.1. Physically Unclonable Function
Physically unclonable functions (PUF) are security primitive capable of
generating a hardware-based digital signature unique for each device [19].
PUFs are commonly implemented as circuits and ensure that responses are
each hardware by exploiting the inherent randomness of the internal struc-
ture introduced by the manufacturing process. This technology has many
attractive advantages, including its relatively low cost (a typical PUF can be
built using few thousands transistors), and its inherent security deriving from
the extreme difficulty of forging its design. Indeed, it is almost impossible
to create a physical clone of a PUF, which means that this technology can
be used reliably to identify those physical objects where a PUF can be inte-
grated, and therefore to detect possible forgery. From a mathematical point
5Ethereum Project (https://www.ethereum.org/)
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of view, a PUF is a function that generates an output (also called response)
starting from an input (also called challenge). The challenge-response data
(CRD) must be unique for a single device. The use of PUF for building
entity-authentication protocols has been extensively explored in the litera-
ture [20, 21, 22]. In general, each entity is provided with a PUF and the
authentication scheme consists of two stages [23]:
1. Enrolment Phase: when a new entity has to be enrolled, a verifier
collects the required CRD from entity’s PUF and stores it in a database,
together with the ID of the entity itself.
2. Verification Phase: when an enrolled entity has to be authenticated,
the verifier receives the entity ID and retrieves the corresponding CRD
from the database. A random challenge-response pair is selected form
the CRD and the challenge is sent in clear to the entity, which com-
putes the response by using its PUF and sends it back in clear to the
verifier. If the response corresponds to that stored in the database,
then the authentication is successful and the challenge-response pair is
removed from stored CRD to prevent replay attacks. Otherwise, the
authentication fails.
Ideally, a PUF should always generate the same response for a given chal-
lenge. Unfortunately, conditions such as temperature or voltage variations
could lead to different responses [24].
A PUF can be implemented in different ways and with different technolo-
gies, leading to varying security guarantees. For example, PUFs based on
SRAM have been proved to be clonable [24], which questions their suitability
to be used to implement authentication protocols. It has been also shown
that a PUF can be vulnerable to machine learning (ML)-based modelling
attacks [24], where an adversary builds an accurate mathematical model of
the PUF by collecting a sufficient number of challenge-response pairs, and
uses that model to clone the PUF itself. There are a number of techniques
that can be used to mitigate the risks of ML-based attacks, such as using
cryptographic blocks to obfuscate the output of the PUF [25], increasing the
circuit complexity of the design [26], or solving this issue at the protocol
level [20, 27].
3.2. Blockchain and Smart Contract
A blockchain is a ledger of transactions, replicated among a number of
nodes organised in a peer-to-peer network. Transactions are submitted to the
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blockchain network and stored in the ledger. A consensus algorithm is run
among blockchain nodes to guarantee the consistency of the ledger, in terms
of what transactions are included in which order. A blockchain provides
strong guarantees in terms of availability, because a peer-to-peer network
with several nodes and no single-point-of-failure is used. Furthermore, as the
ledger is replicated and several nodes participate in the consensus algorithm,
an adversary should take control of a relevant fraction of nodes to take over
the blockchain and tamper with the ledger. That fraction of nodes depends
on the chosen consensus algorithm.
In open, permissionless blockchains like Bitcoins 6 and Ethereums, any
node can join the network without any form of authentication, hence addi-
tional mechanisms are required to cope with the potential presence of mali-
cious nodes. Proof-of-Work (PoW) is commonly employed, which, although
effective in countering cyber threats stemming from malicious blockchain
nodes, is time-consuming and greatly restricts performance [28]. In con-
sortium blockchains like Hyperledger Fabric 7, blockchain membership is re-
stricted to the nodes owned by interested organisations, so that each involved
firm can take part to the overall process and no external actor can interfere
with any operation or read any exchanged data. In this way, blockchain
nodes are known and can be reliably authenticated, which allows to replace
PoW with other, more efficient techniques that ensure high level performance
in terms of latency and throughput, such as byzantine fault tolerance algo-
rithms [29].
On top of a blockchain, a smart contract execution environment can be
built, to extend the functionalities of the blockchain beyond storing data
and allow the execution of any application logic. A smart contract is the
code implementing the required application logic and it can be installed in
a bockchain likewise a normal transaction, which ensures consequently its
integrity. A smart contract defines an interface with methods that can be
called externally. Each invocation of a smart contract method is stored as
a blockchain transaction, hence the execution trace can be considered as
immutable. In general, computations executed through smart contracts are
fully transparent and tamper-proof.
6Bitcoin (https://bitcoin.org/en/)
7Hyperledger Fabric (https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric)
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4. System Model
This section defines the system model representing supply chain (sec-
tion 4.1), PUF-equipped items (section 4.2), blockchain and smart contracts
(sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively). Finally, thread model is introduced in
section 4.5.
4.1. Supply Chain Model
A supply chain SC includes N parties P = {pi}, i.e. organisations in-
volved in the chain with different roles, and that engage among themselves
by supplying and buying items. A supplier is a party that provides items,
while a buyer is a party that receives items. Each party can act at the same
time as supplier for a number of buyers and as buyer for diverse suppliers.
There can be parties that are neither suppliers nor buyers for any other party
but operate anyway in the supply chain, such as auditors or regulators. This
kind of parties usually needs to access tracking data to assess compliance
and solve disputes.
Figure 1: Graphical representation of an instance of the supply chain model with 8 parties
p0, . . . , p7 spread across 3 stages. Arrows represent the supplier-buyer relationships, e.g.
(p1, p3) models the fact that p1 is a supplier of p3.
We model SC as a directed acyclic graph (P ,R), where R is the set of
binary supplier-buyer relationships holding within SC. Figure 1 shows an
instance of the supply chain model. Each element of R is in the form (pi, pj),
with pi, pj ∈ P ∧ pi 6= pj, and represents a supplier-buyer relationship where
pi is the supplier and pj the buyer. According to these relationships, parties
can be organised in stages, i.e. the stages of the supply chain. Let S be the
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number of stages of SC. Without loss of generality 8, we define the function
stage : P → N as follows
stage(p) =
{
0 iff @q ∈ P | (q, p) ∈ R
i + 1 otherwise, where i = max
q∈P|(q,p)∈R
stage(q) (1)
Although equation 1 covers the cases where a buyer has suppliers in differ-
ent stages, this is not likely to happen in real supply chains. Indeed, buyers
commonly purchase items from parties in the previous stage only. Therefore
we introduce the following constraint
∀(p, q) ∈ R stage(q)− stage(p) = 1 (2)
We assume the existence of a reliable public key infrastructure (PKI) for
the parties in P . Each party pi has a key pair (pki, ski), where pki is the
public key known to all the other parties and ski is the private key known
to pi only. We discuss in section 8 how such a PKI can be realised and
the related issues. Given a key k and a plaintext message m, we indicate
with |m|k the ciphertext derived from encrypting m with k. We use 〈m〉σi
to indicate that the message m has been signed by pi, i.e. that it includes a
digest of m encrypted with ski.
4.2. PUF-equipped Item Model
Figure 2: Graphical representation of item xi moving from pj in stage s− 1 to pk in stage
s (xs−1i ), and from there to pl in stage s+ 1 (x
s
i ).
A number of items are moved along the supply chain SC, from parties
at stage 0 to downstream parties. We refer to the generic ith PUF-equipped
8It would be possible for an organisation to operate at different stages of a supply chain.
In these cases, we model such an organisation as multiple parties, one for each stage where
it operates.
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item produced at stage 0 of the supply chain as xi. Furthermore, as items
can be forged along the chain, we define xsi as the item xi after its processing
at stage s, where s = 0 . . . S−1. That is, xsi is the item xi when it is delivered
from the supplier at stage s to the buyer at stage s + 1 (see figure 2).
We refer to the function computed by the PUF integrated with item xsi
as puf si : N→ N. When an item xi is produced at stage 0 and equipped with
a PUF, it is considered intact. If xi is never tampered with along the chain,
then the following property holds with high probability 9
∀c ∈ N ∀s ∈ [1 . . . S − 1] puf 0i (c) = puf si (c) (3)
If instead xi is forged at stage s > 0, then puf
0
i 6= puf si and the following
property holds with high probability 10
∀c ∈ N puf 0i (c) 6= puf si (c) (4)
We consider the case where PUFs are built by using techniques that
mitigate the risk of ML-based attacks 3.1, hence we assume that an adversary
cannot clone a PUF by collecting a sufficient number of challenge-response
pairs.
4.3. Blockchain Model
We consider a consortium blockchain B with N nodesN = {ni}, deployed
over the supply chain parties’ premises (see section 3.2). More precisely, node
ni is located at party pi. Nodes can communicate among each other over the
network by sending messages. The network is asynchronous, there is no
known bound on message latencies but messages are eventually delivered to
their destination. B uses a byzantine fault tolerant consensus protocol, such
as PBFT [29], which ensures safety if up to f = bN−1
3
c nodes are byzantine.
Subsection 4.5 will explain how byzantine nodes behave.
Interactions between nodes take place by sending digitally signed mes-
sages. When a node ni wants to send a message m to another node nj, ni
sends a message 〈i, j, ts,m〉σi to nj. The parameter ts is a timestamp set by
ni, used to avoid replay attacks.
9as explained in section 3.1, the function computed by a PUF is not 100% stable
10even if the two functions are different, they might return the same response for some
challenge
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Clients running within supply chain parties’ premises can submit transac-
tions to B by broadcasting them to all B’s nodes. Submitted transactions are
eventually confirmed by B and persistently stored, with strong guarantees on
their immutability, i.e. persisted transactions cannot be tampered with or
removed unless more than f = bN−1
3
c nodes are byzantine.
4.4. Smart Contract Execution Environment Model
Consortium blockchains like those described in section 4.3 can support the
execution of smart contracts (see section 3.2), i.e. a smart contract execution
environment SCEE can be built on top of a consortium blockchain B. SCEE
is deployed over the same nodes N of B.
Smart contracts can be installed in SCEE . A smart contract C includes a
number of methods, which can be invoked externally, and a key-value store
kvs, which can be accessed internally only, inside those methods. The instal-
lation of a smart contract C in SCEE and every invocation of C’s methods
are persisted as transactions submitted to the underlying blockchain B. This
implies that the application logic encoded by a smart contract cannot be tam-
pered with as long as the underlying blockchain B guarantees immutability,
i.e. unless more than f = bN−1
3
c nodes are byzantine.
The key-value store of each smart contract provides an interface set(k, v)
and get(k) to set and get values for given keys, respectively. Any internal key-
value storage kvs relies on the underlying blockchain B to ensure consistency
and immutability of its state. In the specific, each set operation invoked
through the set(k, v) method is saved as a transaction in B, hence the whole
redo log of the storage is persisted immutably [28]. Furthermore, we assume
that a single set operation is allowed for each key, i.e. the value stored for a
key cannot be overwritten. In case of overwriting attempt, the set operation
returns an error.
4.5. Threat Model
The final goal of the adversary is to tamper with items for its own benefit.
Hence, it aims at avoiding that counterfeit items are detected to prevent
raising suspicion, and anyway it seeks to impede that any detected forgery
is attributed to itself. We assume the existence of a single adversary in the
supply chain, section 8 encompasses a brief discussion on considering the
presence of more independent adversaries.
At supply chain level (see subsection 4.1), the adversary can operate at
one of the parties, say pA at stage stage(pA), with A ∈ [0 . . . N − 1]. We
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assume that the adversary cannot control more than one party and cannot
alter any supplier-buyer relationship.
At item level (see subsection 4.2), the adversary can tamper with items
during the manufacturing processes of the party pA where it operates. For
each bought item x
stage(pA)−1
i , the adversary can decide whether or not to
forge it before supplying it in turn to some other party. However, any tam-
pering with x
stage(pA)−1
i affects the internal structure of the integrated PUF,
hence puf 0i 6= puf sAi (see equations 3 and 4). Furthermore, if the adver-
sary succeeds to collect at least NPUF challenge-response pairs, it can build
a clone of the PUF and attach it to a different item, i.e. it can replace an
original product with a counterfeit.
At blockchain and smart contract execution environment levels (see sub-
sections 4.3 and 4.4), the adversary can control the local node nA of B and
SCEE , i.e. such node is byzantine. The behaviour of a byzantine node can
deviate arbitrarily from the expected conduct, hence it can for example drop
messages and send not expected or wrong messages. Anyway, the adversary
cannot break used cryptographic protocols, hence it cannot decrypt messages
encrypted without knowing the corresponding keys and cannot forge message
signatures.
5. Tracking System
Items are tracked as they move along the supply chain, first when they
are produced at stage 0 and then each time they are supplied to a buyer
operating at the next stage. When delivered at buyer side, the integrity of
each item is verified by using its integrated PUF. Tracking information are
stored as blockchain transactions to ensure they are immutable and available
to any party in P .
The tracking system is built as a smart contract T S on top of a blockchain-
based smart contract execution environment SCEE (see subsection 4.4). We
consider a consortium blockchain B like the one presented in subsection 4.3,
and leverage on the PUFs integrated with the items to assess whether they
have been tampered with (see subsection 4.2). The high-level architecture
is shown in figure 3, where basic building blocks and interfaces with sup-
ply chain business processes are highlighted. Consortium blockchain B,
smart contract execution environment SCEE and tracking system T S are
distributed and deployed over the IT infrastructures of all the parties.
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Module 1 Tracking Mechanism
global variables:
1: C . number of challenges to send for each verification
2: R . number of responses (out of C) that need to be correct for the verification to succeed
local variables:
3: kvs . local key-value storage instance
4: p . party’s identifier, i.e. this instance is deployed on party pp’s premises
B i is the item’s identifier, crdi its challenge-response data
5: method registerItem(i, crdi)
6: kvs.set(〈crd, i〉σp , 〈p, crdi〉σp )
7: end method
B b is the buyer’s identifier, i the item’s identifier
8: method shipItem(b, i)
9: kvs.set(〈shipped, p, b, i〉σp , i)
10: end method
B s is the supplier’s identifier, i the item’s identifier
11: method getChallenges(s, i)
12: if kvs.get(〈shipped, s, p, i〉) = null then . check first if the shipping has been tracked
13: kvs.set(〈no ship, s, p, i〉σp , i)
14: else
15: crdi ← pi2(kvs.get(〈crd, i〉))
16: if cdri = null then . check if the challenge-response data has been stored
17: kvs.set(〈no crd, s, p, i〉σp , i)
18: else
19: crv ← crdi[p] . retrieve from kvs and decrypt the C challenge-response pairs
20: kvs.set(〈declare verification, s, p, i〉σp , 〈crv〉σp )
21: end if
22: end if
23: end method
B s is the supplier’s identifier, i the item’s identifier, crv are the C challenge-response pairs 〈ck, rk〉
previously extracted from crdi, and crv
′ are the C challenge-response pairs 〈ck, r′k〉 computed by the
PUF
24: method verifyItem(s, i, crv, crv′)
25: r ← |{ck | rk = r′k}| . count how many responses match
26: if r ≥ R then
27: kvs.set(〈verification succeeded, s, p, i〉σp , 〈crv〉σp )
28: else
29: kvs.set(〈verification failed, s, p, i〉σp , 〈crv, crv′〉σp )
30: end if
31: end method
15
Figure 3: High-level architecture of the tracking system and its positioning within the
supply chain.
Module 1 shows the pseudo-code of the tracking system, which defines
the four methods shown in figure 3. These methods are used to integrate the
proposed tracking mechanism with the business processes of the supply chain.
In particular, this integration occurs on three specific events: when an item
is first introduced in the supply chain at stage 0 (event 1, see subsection 5.1),
when a supplier ships an item to a buyer (event 2, see subsection 5.2) and
when a shipped item is delivered to a buyer (event 3, see subsection 5.3).
After an item has been processed by a party in the last stage, no further
tracking is enforced.
All tracking data is kept in the blockchain-based key-value storage via
set operations, where any relevant information is digitally signed (see sec-
tion 4.1) by the party executing the method where the set operation itself
is invoked. This, together with the constraint that keys cannot be overwrit-
ten (see section 4.4), ensures that an adversary cannot execute any tracking
system method on behalf of another party.
It is to note that, to integrate in practice supply chain SC business pro-
cesses with the tracking system T S, an additional layer is required to inter-
face the existing legacy business process management software of SC with
the T S smart contract. This integration can be achieved through standard
software engineering approaches and does not entail any element of novelty
or challenge, so it is not described here because out of the scope. Anyway,
16
such integration layer needs to be accounted for as another potential attack
surface that the adversary may exploit, hence in section 6 we also address
the corresponding security implications (attack 5).
5.1. Event 1: New Item
When a new item xi is produced by a party pj at stage 0, a PUF is
integrated with xi and a number C · N of challenge-response pairs 〈ck, rk〉
is collected. This amounts to C pairs for each party, which allows to use
more challenges to verify the integrity of an item at delivery time. In the
specific, in order to make the verification process more robust against possible
variations in the responses generated by a PUF (see section 3.1), C challenges
are used by a buyer when a new item is delivered. Each pair is produced by
generating a unique random challenge ck ∈ N, giving it as input to the PUF of
xi and recording the corresponding output rk = puf
0
i (ck). The set of pairs is
partitioned in N disjoint subsets psw, with w = 0...N − 1, each containing C
pairs. Every pairs subset is then encrypted with the public key of a different
party. We refer to the vector of encrypted pairs subsets as the challenge-
response data (CRD) crdi of xi, i.e. crdi = [|ps0|pk0 , ..., |psN−1|pkN−1 ]. The
encrypted challenge-response pairs subset |psw|pkw for party pw is indicated
as crdi[w], and its decrypted version, available for party pw only, is referred
to as crdi[w].
After the generation of the CRD, the method registerItem(i, crdi) is
invoked. This method simply stores in the key-value storage the information
that the CRD crdi for item xi is available and has been produced by party
pj (line 6).
Party pj has to ensure that no two items are assigned the same identifier,
i.e. for each pair xa, xb of distinct items produced by pj, a 6= b. This can be
easily achieved by concatenating the party’s identifier j with a local counter
that is incremented for each new item.
5.2. Event 2: Shipped Item
When a party ps finishes the manufacturing processes of an item x
stage(ps)
i
and supplies it to a buyer pb operating at the next stage, the procedure
shipItem(b, i) is invoked. Likewise registerItem(), this method simply tracks
in the blockchain that the shipping of item xi from party ps to party pb has
taken place. At line 9 of module 1, all the relevant shipping information
are included in the key, i.e. in the first parameter of set operation, to make
it easier retrieving shipping data. The value, i.e. the second parameter of
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set operation, is not significant and is set to i by convention. Indeed, when
querying the blockchain on whether a certain shipping of item xi from party
ps to party pb took place, it suffices to check that the value stored for the key
〈shipped, s, b, i〉 is not null.
5.3. Event 3: Delivered Item
When an item is delivered to a party pb from a supplier ps operating at
the previous stage, an integrity verification is carried out. Let x
stage(ps)
i be
the delivered item. The party pb calls method getChallenges(s, i) to ob-
tain the C challenges crv to use and the expected responses from the CRD
previously registered (event 1). Then, pb queries the PUF integrated with
x
stage(ps)
i to obtain its actual responses crv
′. Finally, pb calls the method
verifyItem(s, i, crv, crv′) to compare crv with crv′. At least R out C re-
sponses need to be correct for the validation to succeed. In this way the
verification procedure can tolerate possible inconsistent responses returned
by an intact PUF (see section 3.1). The verification outcome is finally tracked
in the blockchain.
The getChallenges(s, i) method verifies first the presence in the blockchain
of the corresponding shipping transaction, and a no ship alert is raised in
negative case (line 13). The CRD is retrieved from the storage by using the
item’s identifier (line 15 11). If no corresponding CRD is found, a no crd
alert is raised (line 17). The challenge-response pairs for pb are retrieved and
decrypted (crdi[p] at line 19). Finally, the chosen pair is tracked in line 20.
The verifyItem method checks whether the C responses r′k obtained from
the PUF queried with the challenges ck correspond to those expected, i.e.
rk. Depending on whether at least R out of C responses match, the proper
tracking information is stored in the key-value storage (lines 27 and 29).
6. Security Analysis
In this section we discuss what a malicious party pA operating at stage
stage(pA) can do and how our proposed tracking mechanism would react.
We first define the relevant attacks an adversary may launch in section 6.1,
11In this line, the operator pii is used to select the i
th component of what the get
operation returns. Indeed, in the corresponding set operation at line 6, the stored value
has two components: the first one is the party’s identifier and the second one is the CRD
itself.
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based on the threat model introduced in section 4.5 and the tracking system
proposed in section 5. Then, in section 6.2 we analyse the response of our
tracking system to each of the identified attacks and whether it succeeds in
coping with them.
6.1. Attacks Definition
According to the threat model introduced in subsection 4.5, the adversary
pA can operate at different levels. As it cannot collude with any other party
nor control their resources, attacks at supply chain level are not relevant. At
item level, pA has several options. The basic one is to just forge an intact
item before supplying it to another buyer (attack 1):
Attack 1. The adversary pA tampers with an item received from an honest
supplier and delivers it to an honest buyer at the next stage.
If party pA works at stage 0, the adversary can tamper with an item
before its PUF is fed with the required number of challenges to compute the
corresponding CRD. In this way, the CRD stored in the blockchain matches
the forged item (attack 2):
Attack 2. The adversary pA tampers with an item at stage 0 before its CRD
is generated and delivers it to an honest buyer at the next stage.
The adversary can tamper with an item just after the delivery and before
it gets verified by the tracking system. To avoid any attribution, pA can blame
the corresponding supplier for the shipping of a counterfeit item (attack 3):
Attack 3. The adversary pA claims that an item it received from an honest
supplier has been tampered with.
At blockchain and smart contract execution environment levels, the ad-
versary can try to compromise the application logic of the smart contract or
the data stored in the blockchain by properly instructing the local node nA,
i.e. node nA becomes byzantine (attack 4).
Attack 4. The adversary pA alters the behaviour of the local node nA, i.e.
node nA becomes byzantine.
The layer between supply chain business processes and tracking system
is an additional attack surface to consider (see section 5). At this level, the
adversary can compromise the way smart contract methods are invoked, e.g.
by using maliciously modified parameters or by not calling a method at all
(attack 5):
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Attack 5. The adversary pA alters how methods of the tracking system smart
contract are called.
6.2. Attacks Analysis
for each of the five attacks identified in the previous subsection, we provide
an analysis of how the proposed tracking system reacts.
Analysis of Attack 1. In this scenario, party pA tampers with an item
x
stage(pA)−1
i received by an honest supplier ps. Since the supplier is honest,
we assume that x
stage(pA)−1
i has not been forged yet. The tampered item is
supplied to another honest party pj at stage stage(pA) + 1. As pj is honest,
it complies with the tracking mechanism described in section 5, hence it
retrieves its C challenge-response pairs crv from the kvs, queries the PUF
puf
stage(pA)
i to compute the corresponding responses crv
′ and calls the method
verifyItem(A, i, crv, crv′) of the tracking system.
We can assume that pA stored the correct tracking information regarding
the shipping of xi, otherwise an alert discrediting pA would be raised by
pj (module 1, line 13). We can also assume that the correct CRD of xi
has been stored in the storage, indeed in this scenario pA does not operate
at stage 0, so the party which produced xi is honest. With reference to
module 1, this means that the checks at lines 12 and 16 are positive and the
C PUF responses in crv′ can be compared against those in crvr. From the
properties expressed by equations 3 and 4, and by the fact that x
stage(pA)
i has
been tampered with, it follows that, with high probability, less than R out
C responses match, hence an alert is raised (line 29) to notify the detection
of a counterfeit item supplied by pA. The accuracy of this forgery detection
mechanism clearly depends on the choice of R. In section 7 we show an
experimental evaluation where R is tuned to maximise the probability that
counterfeits are recognised and minimise the chances that intact items are
mistaken for forged.
It is to note that the challenge-response pairs that will be used for the
verification are known by the intended party only, hence an adversary could
not discover them in advance and build a model to be used to implement a
clone.
Analysis of Attack 2. If pA operates at stage 0 and tampers with an item
x0i , then there are two cases. If the counterfeiting occurs after the invocation
of registerItem() method, then this attack is equivalent to attack 1 and the
forgery is detected by the buyer of xi at stage 1. Otherwise, if the tampering
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is made before and the stored CRD crdi accurately corresponds to puf
0
i , then
this attack cannot be detected by the proposed tracking mechanism.
Analysis of Attack 3. In this case, pA receives an authentic item x
stage(pA)−1
i
from a supplier pj, tampers with it and invokes verifyItem(j, i, c, r, r
′) with
r 6= r′. The reason why the adversary may want to launch this kind of
attack is to discredit pj. Likewise attack 1, the tracking system in the end
succeeds in detecting the counterfeiting. Anyway, it fails in identifying the
counterfeiter party, because the latter is identified by the first parameter of
verifyItem, i.e. j.
Analysis of Attack 4. The attacker can make the local blockchain node
nA behave arbitrarily, i.e. it becomes a byzantine node, with the aim of
compromising data stored in the blockchain or the application logic encoded
in the smart contract of the tracking system. By design, according to the
model presented in section 4.3, in a blockchain with N nodes the adversary
should control at least bN−1
3
c+ 1 nodes to compromise the consensus, hence
if there are at least 4 parties in the supply chain, each with its own local
blockchain node, then this attack cannot succeed.
Analysis of Attack 5. The adversary can interact with the methods pro-
vided by the tracking system differently from what expected. In the specific,
pA can either invoke a method when it should not, or avoid to call a method at
all, or purposely specify wrong values for methods parameters. As explained
in section 5, an adversary cannot call any method on behalf of another party,
hence pA can only operate on the methods it is expected to invoke.
If pA operates st stage 0, it can intentionally avoid to store the CRD for
item xi, i.e. it can skip calling registerItem() method. The motivation could
be to prevent forgery checks from taking place and indeed such a goal can
be partially achieved by the attacker. Anyway, the honest party pj receiving
xi from pA easily discovers that the required CRD crdi is missing (line 16)
and raises an alert (at line 17, with parameters no crd, A, j, i). Although
no forgery can be actually detected in this way, that alert marks xi as a
suspicious item and pA as a disreputable party because it did not store the
CRD.
If pA does not call method shipItem() when expected, then the next
party receiving the corresponding item xi detects this anomaly at line 12
and consequently raises an alert at line 13, which again explicitly points at
pA as the party responsible for this misbehaviour.
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Avoiding the execution of getChallenge() and verifyItem() methods
would bring no advantage to the adversary, with respect to its goal (see
section 4.5) of introducing counterfeited products without being detected.
Altering the parameters used for either registerItem() or shipItem()
method has the same effect of not calling them at all. If instead parameters
are altered for getChallenge() or verifyItem() method, the the integrity
check fails, which leads to the same consequences of attack 3.
7. Experimental Evaluation
We implemented a prototype of the proposed solution to verify the tech-
nical feasibility of the integration of blockchain and PUF, and to assess the
reliability of PUF technology to accurately detect counterfeit. We used Hy-
perLedger Fabric 12 to implement the consortium blockchain and the smart
contract execution environment (see sections 4.3 and 4.4). We chose this
platform because it is one of the most stable and well documented platforms
for consortium blockchains. The tracking system T S defined in module 1
has been coded as a Fabric chaincode. A 4 bit sequential ring oscillator ar-
chitecture [30] PUF has been synthesised and implemented on 17 separate
Zynq Zybo 7000 FPGA boards [31].
The interface between the tracking system and the PUFs has been imple-
mented as a Java application. The communication with PUF has been done
using RXTXComm 13, a library which makes use of Java Native Interface
(JNI 14) to provide a fast and reliable method of communication over serial
ports. The communication at PUF side has been encapsulated in a dedicated
module which used General Purpose Input Output (GPIO) as Tx and Rx
pins for Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) serial com-
munication.
We first describe how we tuned the PUF (section 7.1), then we describe
the use case we tested and what results we obtained (section 7.2).
7.1. PUF Tuning
The tuning of PUFs consisted in choosing the right value of parameter
R, i.e. how many responses out of C need to be correct for the validation to
12Hyperledger Fabric (https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric)
13RXTXComm (https://seiscode.iris.washington.edu/projects/rxtxcomm)
14JNI (https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/jni/)
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succeed, where C is the number of unique challenges sent to the PUF. We
set C to 10.
We first generated the CRD for all the 17 PUFs by collecting a large
number of challenge-response pairs for each PUF (more than 21000 pairs).
We then randomly selected 3 out of the available 17 PUFs for tuning, while
the others were used for the prototype test (section 7.2). We refer to those 3
PUFs as the tuning PUFs. Challenges drawn from CRD data of all the PUF
have been sent to the tuning PUFs to collect the correspondent responses.
The resulting dataset has been used to find a value of R that guarantees
that each tuning PUF (i) passes the validation when stimulated with its own
CRD and (ii) fails the validation when stimulated with CRD of any of the
other 16 PUF.
Each tuning PUF has been stimulated with C = 10 unique challenges
from each of the 17 PUFs (hence including itself) for 15 times. For each
batch of C challenge-response pairs, different values of R has been tested,
ranging from 5 to 9, and the corresponding validation outcome has been
recorded. The metrics of interest for the tuning are
• True Admission Rate (TAR): rate of successful validations when the
tuning PUF is validated against its own CRD;
• False Admission Rate (FAR): rate of successful validations when the
tuning PUF is validated against the CRD of another PUF;
• True Rejection Rate (TRR): rate of failed validations when the tuning
PUF is validated against the CRD of another PUF;
• False Rejection Rate (FRR): rate of failed validations when the tuning
PUF is validated against its own CRD;
The ideal situation is when TAR and TRR are 1 while FAR and FRR are
0.
Figure 4 shows the values of those metrics for R varying from 5 to 9 (out
of 10) for the three tuning PUFs. It can be noted that TAR is always 1 and
FRR always 0, which means that the tuning PUFs are successfully validated
all the times their own CRD is used. When the validation is based instead
on CRD of a different PUF, sometimes tuning PUFs still pass the validation.
This happens because the functions computed by different PUFs can overlap
for certain challenges. Figure 4 shows that the probability that this occurs
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(a) Tuning PUF 1 (b) Tuning PUF 2 (c) Tuning PUF 3
Figure 4: Tuning of 3 PUFs, R is varied between 5 and 9 out of 10 and the corresponding
value of metrics TAR, FAR, TRR, FRR are shown.
(i.e. FAR) decreases as R grows, and that with R = 9 FAR is 0 (and TRR is
1) for all the 3 tuning PUFs. Hence, for the prototype test, the validation of
a PUF is considered successful if at least 9 out of 10 responses match those
stored in the corresponding CRD.
7.2. Prototype Test
We developed a prototype with three organisations: manufacturer, lo-
gistic and distribution. The corresponding supplier-buyer relationships are
depicted in figure 5. We considered two cases: when no adversary is present
and when the logistic organisation is malicious and tampers with the items
supplied by the manufacturer before delivering them to the distribution or-
ganisation.
Figure 5: Supplier-buyer relationships in the prototype.
We used the other 14 PUFs for the prototype test, 8 for the case where
no party is malicious and 6 for the case where the logistic organisation is
the adversary. In the latter case, the manufacturer delivers 3 PUFs to the
logistic organisation, which replaces each of them using the other 3 PUFs
and deliver them to the distribution organisation.
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When there is no adversary, all the 8 PUFs pass the validation both at the
logistic and at the distribution organisation, hence the TAR is 1 and FRR is
0. When instead the logistic organisation replaces the the three PUFs, all of
them fail the validation at the distribution organisation, therefore the FAR
is 0 and TRR is 1.
These preliminary results are promising to prove both the technical feasi-
bility and the effectiveness in counterfeit mitigation of the proposed tracking
system.
8. Discussion
This section discusses several key aspects of the proposed solution, point-
ing out key limitations and main research directions to investigate as future
work: the results of the security analysis (section 8.1), the issues of im-
plementing a PKI infrastructure for a consortium blockchain (section 8.2),
the limitations of the chosen threat model (section 8.3), the feasibility of
embedding PUFs within the items to track (section 8.4), possible privacy is-
sues when sharing data among parties through the blockchain (section 8.5),
observations on consortium blockchain performance and scalability (see sec-
tion 8.6) and, finally, considerations on the costs associated with adopting
the proposed solution in real supply chains (section 8.7).
8.1. Security Analysis Results
The results of security analysis presented in section 6 show the capa-
bility of the proposed tracking system to be effective against the identified
attacks. Any attempt to counterfeit items (attack 1) is correctly detected
and attributed to the right malicious party.
If the adversary operates at stage 0 and tampers with the item before the
corresponding CRD is built and stored in the blockchain (attack 2), then the
tracking system fails to detect the forgery. This derives trivially from relying
on the CRD itself to be the trust root of the whole counterfeit detection
mechanism. Enhancing the proposed approach to cover threats happening
before CRD generation is one of our main future work.
In case the attacker forges a received item just before the integrity checks
(attack 3), the tracking system succeeds in spotting the counterfeiting but
fails in the attribution, i.e. the honest supplier of the adversary is held
accountable. Improving the accuracy in identifying the malicious party is
another relevant future extension for this work.
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The other attacks at software level, to make a blockchain node byzan-
tine (attack 4), or at the interface between supply chain business processes
and tracking system (attack 5), have been shown to be not effective. On
the one hand, this derives from by-design security properties provided by
blockchain-based systems, indeed using PBFT-like consensus algorithms al-
lows to tolerate a single byzantine node when the blockchain includes at
least four nodes (attack 4). On the other hand, the tracking system prevents
an adversary from invoking smart contract methods on behalf of a different
party, so attacks based on altering how methods are called (attack 5) are not
relevant.
8.2. PKI Infrastructure for Consortium Blockchains
The proposed tracking system relies on a consortium blockchain (see sec-
tion 4.3), which in turn requires a reliable PKI to obtain the relationships
between parties’ identities and public keys. These certificates are issued when
the platform is setup at the beginning and when the supply chain membership
changes. From a security perspective, the PKI is a single-point-of-failure, i.e.
an adversary may target the PKI to take over the whole blockchain, and thus
the tracking system.
This problem has been already addressed in literature. For example,
there exist proposed solutions based on blockchain to decentralise the PKI
so as to make it much more resistant to cyber attacks [32, 33], and provide
attack tolerance guarantees comparable to those already provided by the
tracking system. These solutions are based on public blockchains, which may
introduce privacy issues. Other approaches have been proposed for privacy-
preserving blockchain-based PKI, such as PB-PKI [34]. The integration of
the tracking system with this type of PKI is out of the scope of this paper
and is left as future work.
8.3. Threat Model Limitations
The list of attacks identified in section 6.1 depends tightly on the threat
model introduced in section 4.5, which in turn derives from two main as-
sumptions: (i) there is a single adversary and (ii) it controls exactly one
party. It can be reasonable to consider the implications of relaxing those
assumptions and identify what additional attack scenarios may arise when
an adversary can control more parties or when more adversaries are active,
either independently or by colluding among themselves.
26
We can expect that a security analysis of the proposed tracking system
against such a stronger attack model would point out further vulnerabilities.
However, this analysis should be integrated with a risk assessment to measure
the likelihood of more advanced attacks, and should estimate out to what
extent they can be considered reasonable. Taking into account wider threat
models is an additional potential future work.
8.4. Embedding PUFs within Items to Track
The effectiveness of tracking items by using PUFs strictly depends on how
easily an adversary can forge items without affecting the PUFs themselves.
If a PUF can be removed from an item and embedded within a different one,
then the whole counterfeit detection mechanism is flawed. In the end, this
boils down to preliminarily check whether it is technically feasible to embed
PUFs within items in such a way that all the properties of the PUF-equipped
item model hold true (see section 4.2).
Electronic components are items where PUFs can be be easily and cheaply
implanted by integrating PUF circuitry inside the component circuitry, en-
suring that PUFs cannot be removed and replaced. Hence, the approach we
propose fits well with integrated circuits and IoT devices supply chains.
8.5. Privacy Issues
Although the network of companies involved in the supply chain should
be made as transparent as possible to enhance visibility, organisations can
be legitimately reluctant to disclose their own supplier network and procure-
ment history to other, possibly competitor firms. What information should
be shared needs to be adjusted according to this kind of confidentiality re-
quirements, on a case by case basis. An important applied research direction
to investigate, for each target supply chain market, concerns this trade-off
between privacy and scope, with the aim to find the sweet spot where infor-
mation on supplier network and procurement history can be shared smoothly.
A general approach to address those privacy issues is to make each trans-
action only visible to a specific subset of parties. With reference to our
prototype implementation, Hyperledger Fabric provides the concept of chan-
nels to establish between subsets of nodes. A transaction can be associated
to a specific channel to ensure only the nodes in that channel can see its
content. Our prototype can be enhanced with privacy-preserving techniques
by relying on Fabric channels.
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8.6. Performance and Scalability
While public permissionless blockchains like Ethereum’s are known to pro-
vide limited performances in terms of transaction latency and throughput,
consortium blockchain can commit thousands of transactions per seconds
with subsecond latency [35], also in WAN settings [36]. In terms of scalabil-
ity, BFT-tolerant algorithms have been proposed in literature that can scale
to tens of nodes with minor performance penalties [37, 38], which matches
realistic supply chain setting including tens of different organisations.
8.7. Platform Integration Costs
Each supply chain works according to specific business processes which
may differ significantly from market to market. On the one hand, pinpointing
the right abstraction level for the interface provided by the tracking system
is crucial to increase the cases where it can be integrated. On the other
hand, the integration with those business processes deserves a deeper anal-
ysis in terms of security, to figure out whether additional cyber threats can
be identified at those integration points (see attack 5 in section 6.1), and
cost-effectiveness, to quantify whether and to what extent the benefits of
counterfeiting mitigation outweigh the costs to accomplish such a large-scale
integration.
In terms of cost-effectiveness, it is to note that relying on consortium
blockchains rather public permissionless blockchains allows to cut any cost
due to the fees to pay when submitting transactions. Indeed, while supply
chain tracking solutions based on Ethereum have a per-transaction cost (e.g.
see Negka et al. [18]), submitting transactions in Hyperledger Fabric is totally
free.
9. Conclusion
In this paper we design a tracking system to mitigate counterfeits in
supply chains of physical products. The solution we propose is based on
blockchain and smart contract technologies to provide high availability and
strong tolerance against integrity attacks against stored data and application
logic. We rely on physically unclonable functions to uniquely identify and
accurately track items along the supply chain. We validate our solution
against a specific threat model and find out that it is effective to counter
the identified attacks, but (i) an adversary operating at the first stage of the
supply chain can bypass the anti-counterfeit mechanism and (ii) an adversary
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receiving an item from a honest supplier can tamper with that item and
blame the supplier itself for the forgery. Finally, we implemented and tested
a prototype of the proposed tracking system to prove it is technically feasible
and accurate in correctly validating both intact and forged items.
In addition to investigate possible solutions to the limitations discovered
in the security analysis, other future work include the integration of a reli-
able PKI infrastructure within the tracking system and the implications of
considering a stronger threat model.
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